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If we had to go to the Business Development Centre 
– to attend its opening or during its development 
stage – 5 Bushmasters had to escort us. I had to wear 
my military uniform and came fully armed. In that 
way, you can’t go into the classroom to see how the 
teacher is doing. If you do that, the people in the 
classroom will think: “What on earth is happening 
here? Someone from the military is coming in”. That 
is the disadvantage of educating people in such an 
environment.
Quote from an IDEA-officer, Kramer and Jansen, 2011
Introduction
The scene of military officers training and advising local entrepreneurs will not 
be the first one that comes to mind when thinking about Mission Uruzgan. Yet, a 
specific unit of the Dutch Armed Forces, called IDEA, was specifically deployed for 
these purposes. The acronym IDEA stands for Integrated Development of Entrepre-
neurial Activities and refers to a unit composed of reserve officers. In their everyday 
lives, these reserve officers are consultants, entrepreneurs, administrators or bankers 
and they were deployed in Uruzgan for three months. During these three months 
they worked on Private Sector Development. Although it might appear like an exotic 
experiment for Armies to develop units for these purposes, IDEA can be understood 
as a reaction to the challenges of post-conflict environments.
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 Armed conflict and violence have significant consequences for many aspects 
of people’s lives. In its PCER–report the United Nations formulated this as follows 
(UNDP, 2008: xvii): ‘The legacy of conflict includes substantial loss of livelihoods, 
employment and incomes, debilitated infrastructure, collapse of state institutions 
and rule of law, continuing insecurity and fractured social networks.’ It will there-
fore be obvious that to organizations and agencies involved, post-conflict rebuilding 
activities pose enormous challenges (Paris and Sisk, 2009). While an Army is trained 
and equipped to deal with safety and security issues, and while these issues are cen-
tral to its missions in post-conflict rebuilding environments, inevitably they face 
challenges that lie outside this realm. It is well-established that economic misery can 
be caused by violent conflict; while by the same token, economic misery can also lead 
to violent conflict. The PCER report formulates this as follows (UNDP, 2008: xix): ‘War 
results from as well as in socioeconomic and political imbalances. Such imbalances 
are major factors in the outbreak of conflict in the first place and high risk factors in 
the recurrence of conflict’. At the same time, for economic development to prosper, 
a safe and secure environment is important. The topics of economic development, 
safety and security are therefore firmly interrelated (Collier, 2008). 
 IDEA can be perceived as a specific answer of the military organization to the 
challenges of post-conflict environments. The quote at the top of this chapter shows 
just one of the everyday problems that IDEA-officers experienced – in this case 
reviewing the success of a ‘train the trainer programme’. Obviously, stimulating 
entrepreneurship in an environment such as Uruzgan is quite a challenging task 
for both ‘teachers’ and ‘students’. The experiences of IDEA-officers are interesting in 
themselves since we can analyze the variables that foster entrepreneurship in a dif-
ferent cultural setting and under extreme circumstances, comparing and contrasting 
them with the ones displayed in the European or American contexts. Additionally, 
these experiences also reveal to an extent the adversity of post-conflict rebuilding. 
Indeed, the uniqueness of the IDEA initiative comes from the fact that it works on 
stimulating entrepreneurship in post-conflict environments within the confines of 
a military organization. Actually, IDEA crosses the boundaries between military 
organizations and development agencies. 
 Due to the fact that the rebuilding activity is performed within the context 
of a military organization, the IDEA-case could shed light on the challenges of 
post-conflict rebuilding and on the variables that foster it in Uruzgan. In that 
sense, the IDEA-case could be considered a microcosm in which general challenges 
and dilemmas of post-conflict rebuilding are visible on a small scale. This chapter 
describes and analyzes the IDEA-case, exploring four central questions:
1. What kinds of activities were employed by IDEA in Mission Uruzgan?
2. What kind of challenges did IDEA-officers experience during their work?
3. What do the experiences of IDEA-officers reveal about the challenges of 
post-conflict rebuilding?
4. How do the experiences of IDEA-officers compare to experiences in other 
contexts?
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In order to delve into these questions, some basic theory about the concepts of 
development and entrepreneurship in unique environments is discussed.
Stimulating entrepreneurship and development
The philosophy behind IDEA is that entrepreneurship is essential for an economy to 
develop. Development literature indeed acknowledges that entrepreneurship at the 
Base (or Bottom) of the Pyramid (BoP) plays an important role in poverty reduc-
tion (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Stern, 2002), being considered a self-organ-
izing and bottom-up economic force that mobilizes scattered and hidden develop-
ment resources (Ellerman, 2006: 208). As a matter of fact, the topic of stimulating 
BoP-entrepreneurship is one of the main issues of the 2005 World Development 
Report (World Bank, 2005: 1):
Private firms – from farmers and microentrepreneurs to local manufacturing 
companies and multinational enterprises – are at the heart of the development 
process. Driven by the quest for profits, they invest in new ideas and new facilities 
that strengthen the foundation of economic growth and prosperity. They provide 
more than 90 percent of jobs, creating opportunities for people to apply their 
talents and improve their situations. They provide the goods and services needed 
to sustain life and improve living standards. They are also the main source of tax 
revenues, contributing to public funding for health, education, and other services. 
Firms are thus critical actors in the quest for growth and poverty reduction.
The relationship between entrepreneurship and development in emerging econo-
mies and post-conflict rebuilding conditions is both intricate and arduous. It is 
generally tied to a deficiency of wealth – due to institutional voids, economic and 
social instability, and a lack of trust in institutions and people. There are 3 billion 
people with an average wealth per adult of below USD 10,000 of which 1.1 billion 
own less than USD 1,000 (per year). Around 2.5 billion people are yet unbanked 
(Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2011). In order for countries to develop, the gen-
eration of economic wealth is important. Entrepreneurial activities are a start, but 
at the same time it is generally acknowledged that entrepreneurship in challenging 
contexts must be accompanied by advances in financial services (i.e., microfinance). 
 In order to understand how entrepreneurship at the BoP could promote devel-
opment in emerging and post-conflict contexts, we first need to establish what we 
mean by the BoP, and second, how the firms which originate at the BoP – most 
of them family-owned micro-enterprises – could have an economic and a social 
development potential. The BoP was originally defined by Prahalad and Hammond 
(2002) as a market containing the poorest people in the world, which they defined 
as those making less than $ 2,000 per year (purchasing power parity in US dollars). 
Since this original articulation, there has been a lot of controversy surrounding the 
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exact nature of the BoP, leading to a new definition. London (2007: 11) empha-
sizes: ‘The base of the pyramid is a term that represents the poor at the base of 
the global socio-economic ladder, who primarily transact in an informal market 
economy.’ Prahalad and Hammond (2002) claim that although each individual’s 
market power is very small, the aggregate market power is significant. When view-
ing this from an intermediate producer/ service provider perspective, the pyrami-
dal economic potential (aggregate supply) of micro-enterprises at the BoP possess 
can be devised, since they could push forward with less effort micro-consumption 
(from ‘new’ emerging consumers) and drive economic advance or recovery as well 
as ‘partial’ wealth accumulation. 
 Notably, almost 98% of micro-enterprises are either family-owned or family 
operated. The latter makes sense, due to the fact that low-income families – with 
limited or no access to credit – use their savings and labour in order to create a 
road to self-sufficiency. The family provides therefore a safety-net for entrepreneurs, 
offering not only economic support, but also “cheap” human capital to develop the 
entrepreneurial activity. Indeed, a significant increase in family-owned micro-
enterprises within emerging economies in Latin America, China and India can 
be observed. It is furthermore well-established that family values exert a crucial 
influence on the conduct of family members and on the decision-making processes 
within family firms (Trevinyo-Rodríguez, 2010). The family value system is con-
tinuously (re)articulated, being a force that stimulates long-term decision making 
in family enterprises. This long-term perspective is (generally) fostered, because 
the family business is expected to provide the “family” with wellbeing and stability. 
Family micro-enterprises at the BoP might therefore have not only the economic 
strength to push the economy, but also might drive emotional ties to unite and 
commit the family. This explains why families in these conditions are an important 
part of the institutional context. 
 The previous shows that development is not just about economic growth. Pro-
gress equally depends on getting policies right and building effective institutions 
to implement them: building effective health systems, establishing a credit system, 
ensuring that education is available, etc. This is emphasized by Amartya Sen (1999: 
20) when calling for a more ‘inclusive’ understanding of development in which 
individual and collective freedom is the essential goal. He notes that poverty should 
be seen as a deprivation of basic capabilities essential for a humane existence. The 
question is not whether people have enough resources, but, ‘do they really have 
choices?’ Development in a broader sense means giving people substantial access to 
the means of accumulating social power. If ‘inclusive development’ should be the 
goal of development, ‘inclusive entrepreneurship’ might be a valuable conceptual-
ization of a developmental strategy in very different contexts (Trevinyo-Rodríguez, 
et al., 2010). This conceptualization is supported by trends in organizing studies 
on the concept entrepreneurship. Rindova et al. (2009: 478) propose to focus on 
the verb ‘entrepreneuring’ instead of the noun entrepreneurship. Entrepreneuring is 
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regarded as an activity that is not necessarily an economic activity, but a ‘liberating’ 
activity focused on ‘social change’ (Calás et al., 2009: 552). 
 The BoP way of thinking is a theory. It is a particular way of thinking about 
economic development and poverty alleviation. For some, this theory might sound 
overly optimistic and one may suspect that the actual conditions in which this 
theory is to be applied are quite intransigent. Therefore, empirical research is neces-
sary to develop insight into the conditions that stimulate or hinder the develop-
ment of inclusive entrepreneurship at the BoP. Indeed, much entrepreneurship in 
BoP conditions is survivalist entrepreneurship (Naudé 2010b: 233), with hardly any 
possibilities for ‘inclusive’ ambitions. People living in poor conditions often have 
limited resources and entitlement opportunities. They will often lack the entrepre-
neurial and organizational skills to run larger businesses facing social, economic, 
and political problems. Furthermore, they often are confronted with the problem of 
‘rogue leadership’ (i.e., mafias, terrorists, criminal gangs and warlords), which often 
forms the political context in which microenterprises have to operate, particularly 
in places where the state is too weak ( Johnson and Soeters, 2008). Nevertheless, 
when pushed by necessity, human beings become creative, especially if their family 
depends on it to survive. 
The IDEA-case
The IDEA project aims to stimulate economic development by promoting entrepre-
neurial activities within post-conflict environments, being therefore an initiative 
that may promote inclusive development under extreme circumstances. Post-con-
flict environments are exceptional since they not only lack institutional infrastruc-
ture but also are ‘building or reconstructing [the] country after its government, 
institutions, population, and economy have been ravaged by large scale conflict’ 
(Voorhoeve, 2007: 19). One can imagine that in these environments, stimulating 
entrepreneurship is particularly challenging. According to Naudé (2010a: 4) entre-
preneurship is particularly important here because: ‘Firms that survive persistent 
conflict do so because of entrepreneurs who are able to adjust their business models 
in the face of conflict, for instance by reducing technological sophistication, relo-
cating supply chains and production locations, or reducing long-term investment.’ 
 IDEA is an organization that is jointly developed and controlled by the Dutch 
Armed Forces and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers 
(known as VNO-NCW) and was established in 2000. Since 2006 the operational 
part of IDEA has been subsumed under the Dutch CIMIC battalion. The goal of 
IDEA is to build and develop sustainable local entrepreneurial capacity by advis-
ing and training entrepreneurs in post-conflict rebuilding contexts and by inform-
ing military commanders regarding instruments for private sector development. 
Since 2000, IDEA-officers have been deployed in Bosnia, Baghlan (Afghanistan), 
Uruzgan (Afghanistan) and in a couple of individual missions in Africa (Sudan, 
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Burundi and Congo). IDEA-officers generally have a background as entrepreneurs, 
bankers, accountants, or consultants. After having received basic military training 
and a specific mission training, they can be deployed as reserve officers. In Uruzgan, 
IDEA-officers generally were deployed for 3 months, which is shorter than other 
militaries (4-6 months). The rationale for this is that IDEA-officers have jobs or own 
businesses in the Netherlands and can only spare a couple of months. 
 The strategic niche IDEA sees for itself is a particular type of mission in areas 
in which regular development agencies and NGOs are unable to operate as a result 
of unsafe conditions. These are post-conflict rebuilding areas in which a military 
organization is able to reach certain unsafe areas, but according to IDEA other 
organizations aren’t, or at least only sparsely. IDEA-officers are able to enter these 
areas and to work on development issues. Central to the IDEA-philosophy is that 
initiating development activities in this unsafe phase is important, not only from 
a developmental perspective but also because it supports the force acceptance of the 
military units. In Uruzgan, IDEA was part of the Dutch CIMIC effort and therefore 
related to the mission teams that worked on rebuilding issues. 
 The IDEA-case was studied using a qualitative methodological approach. The 
methodological strategy of this case-study was adopted from the grounded theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In 2010, we interviewed 21 people who can 
be differentiated in 4 different groups: IDEA-management, IDEA-officers, external 
academic specialists, and external post-conflict rebuilding specialists. The inter-
views were topic guided and subsequently transcribed and analyzed. The analysis 
focused on categorizing (1) different projects undertaken by IDEA and (2) finding 
factors that influenced the activities of IDEA. In a case report, the first results were 
described and reflected upon (Kramer and Jansen, 2011). The case report was used 
to develop the case description in this chapter. 
IDEA in Mission Uruzgan
IDEA was not deployed from the onset of Mission Uruzgan but came into the 
mission area in 2008. At first only one IDEA-officer was deployed in Tarin Kowt at 
Camp Holland. Later, a second IDEA-officer was deployed in Deh Rawod because 
it was felt that the specific demands of this outpost required the input of another 
IDEA officer. Below we will sketch the basic activities of IDEA in the mission area. 
The Development of a Local Business Development Center 
The development of a local Business Development Centre (BDC) is a cornerstone 
of IDEA’s approach when it enters in a region. A BDC is an economic structure with 
a function that is comparable to a chamber of commerce in Western countries. It 
aims to concentrate different kinds of supportive activities for entrepreneurs. It 
provides, for example, training and advice to entrepreneurs and provides them with 
an opportunity to build a social network. Essential in developing a BDC is that its 
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management is taken over by a local NGO. This should guarantee sustainability after 
IDEA has left the region. In Uruzgan this was the Afghan Centre for Training and 
Development (ACTD), which signed a contract with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. This ministry provided funds for the BDC for a particular time-period and 
ACTD was obliged to meet some criteria (i.e., train a specific number of entrepre-
neurs). IDEA was involved in establishing this contract and was busy with training 
ACTD people to run the BDC (train the trainers). The concept of establishing a BDC 
which would be taken over by locals was originally developed by IDEA in Bosnia. 
There, the local interpreters took it over after IDEA left. According to some IDEA-
officers the BDCs in Baghlan and Bosnia are still operational. In Uruzgan, estab-
lishing a BDC was much more challenging than in Baghlan or Bosnia particularly 
because of the safety situation. IDEA-officers couldn’t visit the BDC whenever they 
pleased because of the safety situation. Furthermore, it proved to be difficult to find 
the trainers to be trained. 
Training Entrepreneurs 
Another central activity of IDEA in Uruzgan has been the training of entrepreneurs. 
From the time the IDEA officers arrived until the BDC was opened, IDEA recruited 
entrepreneurs for training, offering them the opportunity to learn about business 
management. These training programmes were offered to anyone who was inter-
ested and actually showed up. Not all ‘entrepreneurs’ in the classes owned their 
own business when initiating the courses, and actually IDEA officers doubt whether 
some of them will ever do. 
 IDEA uses a specific method to train entrepreneurs. This is the Start and Improve 
your Business-method developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
This method is used all over the developing world and can also be used to train 
illiterates (see textbox). ILO licenses IDEA to use this methodology and it trains 
IDEA-officers to be trainers. In Uruzgan, IDEA trained around 200 entrepreneurs 
in the ILO method and trained ACTD people in the ILO-method (train the trainer). 
The activity of training entrepreneurs was met with different challenges. Some-
times it was difficult to motivate people to attend training-sessions, one IDEA-
officer emphasized, because a certain level of economic activity is necessary to make 
training relevant. Furthermore, because Afghans in Uruzgan are busy with basic 
survival, attending training during several hours a day is a luxury not everyone can 
afford. Also, because trainings were initially given at Camp Holland, they had to 
come to Camp Holland and therefore had to associate themselves with the Dutch 
Army. That in itself provided a safety hazard to Afghans, the impact of which is 
difficult to assess.
Establishing a Microcredit System
Another central activity of IDEA was the establishment of a microcredit bank. The 
development of a microcredit bank is an activity IDEA initiated together with the 
World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
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SIYB-ILO
The Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) course is a training programme devel-
oped by the International Labour Organization (ILO), specifically oriented toward 
developing countries. According to the ILO-website, the SIYB method has an 
outreach of 1.5 million trainees, thereby being one of the biggest global manage-
ment training programmes currently on the market. It has been translated into more 
than 30 languages and adapted to local conditions in more than 50 countries. 
ILO explicates that the SIYB method is both oriented at entrepreneurs and on those 
that stimulate entrepreneurship. Originally developed in the 1980s, it is oriented at 
enabling local business development service providers to effectively and indepen-
dently implement business start up and improvement training and related activities. 
Furthermore, it is oriented at enabling potential and existing small entrepreneurs 
(both women and men) through these organizations to start viable businesses, to 
increase the viability of existing enterprises, and to create quality employment for 
others in the process. 
The SIYB-course consists of interrelated training packages and supporting materi-
als for small-scale entrepreneurs to start and grow their businesses. It aims at 
increasing the viability of Small and Medium Enterprises through management 
principles suitable for the environment of developing countries. The four basic 
packages of the SIYB method are:
1 Generate Your Business. This package is intended for people without a business 
plan who would like to start a business. 
2 Start Your Business. This package is for potential entrepreneurs with a concrete 
business idea who want to start a profitable and sustainable small business. The 
programme is a combination of training, fieldwork and after-training support 
activities. 
3 Improve Your Business. This package introduces already practicing entrepreneurs 
to good principles of business management, i.e. marketing, costing, stock control, 
record keeping, buying and business planning.
4 Expand Your Business. This gives growth-oriented small and medium entrepre-
neurs the practical tools to implement and realize fast business growth and profits.
Source: www.ilo.org
 
Affairs. The bank was located on Camp Holland, but it also had offices in Deh 
Rawod and Chora. In the final stages of IDEA’s presence in Uruzgan, the bank had 
around 1,200 customers and issued approximately 500,000 dollars in loans. The 
development of this bank was met with some particular and peculiar challenges. 
One example was that the microcredit bank developed certain undesirable prac-
tices to stimulate repayment (basically threatening clients). Furthermore, a 14 year-
old boy, who was related to a local powerbroker, was a member of the management 
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in one of the offices. Phenomena such as these were considered to be in contradic-
tion to the entrepreneurial climate IDEA aimed to establish. 
Creating clusters of firms 
Developing cooperatives between small, often family-owned firms was a develop-
ment strategy that had already been initiated by IDEA in Bosnia and Baghlan. One 
particular example of a cooperative in Uruzgan is a ‘cold storage’ that was built by 
the Dutch Army (basically a container buried in the ground). The economic logic 
for cold storage was that if farmers were able to store their products, they would 
be able to market them for a longer time-period. In that case, farmers would be 
able to sell products at times where there is less supply and therefore prices are 
higher. The challenge for IDEA is that a sustainable value chain and an organization 
(cooperative) structure have to be developed around a physical structure. Develop-
ing cooperatives is a well-known development instrument (Penrose-Buckley, 2007). 
One challenge of establishing cooperatives in Uruzgan was that the mere phrase 
‘cooperative’ has ‘Soviet’ connotations in Afghanistan, which after the Soviet occu-
pation of Afghanistan in the 1980s is problematic. Another challenge is that in a 
region such as Uruzgan, people who are able to run a cooperative are scarce because 
of lack of education, a problem frequently encountered in developing countries 
(Carmen & Sobrado, 2000). Within IDEA there had been some discussion whether 
such – more or less – advanced solutions were in fact suitable for the poorer areas of 
Uruzgan. One particular IDEA-officer called developing cooperative clusters ‘jump-
ing ten meters high’ given the economic state of the area.
Giving advice to military commanders
The last category of activities of IDEA that we will discuss here is advising mili-
tary commanders. One example in which IDEA-officers advised their mission-team 
commanders was in the Deh Rawod area. There, IDEA made a social economical 
assessment and a development plan. This development plan connected economic 
development and issues that are covered by other CIMIC-specialists. For example, 
part of the plan was that a court-system should be established. Although it might 
seem quite different from Private Sector Development, and although IDEA-officers 
didn’t actually work on establishing such a system – it is actually an important pre-
requisite for the development of economic activity. This shows that private sector 
development is not an activity that occurs in isolation, but that it is related to other 
‘social development’ issues. Part of the social development plan that was devel-
oped by IDEA was also that some ways to help women to contribute to economic 
activities were sought, particularly women with a problematic social standing (for 
example widows). This is actually an example of how ‘emancipation through entre-
preneurship’ might work. Another example of the advisory role to military com-
manders was an IDEA-officer who asked soldiers to observe whether local farmers 
struggled with parasites in their fruit-trees. Although soldiers initially didn’t see 
the relevance of such an issue, the IDEA-officer argued that this was crucial, also 
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from a security perspective. A farmer that with parasites in his fruit-trees sees his 
income threatened. As a result, he might become more vulnerable to Taliban per-
suasion to plant Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on the roads that pass his 
parcels. One particular challenge for this advisory role is that it was an ‘unstable 
function’. Whether IDEA officers developed an advisory role differed between time 
periods. To start with, it very much depended on personal relationships between 
IDEA-officers and military commanders who were both only deployed for a couple 
of months. Furthermore, because the challenges of Uruzgan were partly new to 
the Dutch Army, no established way for this advisory role to be enacted was avail-
able. Mission Uruzgan was therefore the scene of many ‘organizational experiments’ 
which sometimes creatively solved local problems, but which also could become 
lost if newly rotated personnel failed to see the relevance. 
Challenges for IDEA in Mission Uruzgan
The previous section briefly discussed IDEAs main activities in Mission Uruzgan. 
Here we want to discuss some challenges with which IDEA-officers were confront-
ed during these activities. These challenges refer to the different specific environ-
mental conditions in which their activities were conducted.
 The first challenge is the nature of the local economic situation. Uruzgan is a 
region that differs significantly from Baghlan and Bosnia, in which IDEA had been 
previously deployed. Consequently, it is more difficult to implement specific IDEA-
concepts, such as the BDC, which at times was even difficult to reach for IDEA-
officers. One particular challenge of the Uruzgan-region was that it was much 
poorer than Bosnia and Baghlan. The economic landscape is described by some 
IDEA-officers as ‘biblical’, with many small farms which produce crops mainly for 
the farmers and their family’s own use. An industrial structure, which was available 
in Bosnia and in a rudimentary way also in Baghlan, does not exist. Also craftsman-
ship was only developed in a rudimentary way. As a result, discussion arose within 
IDEA regarding which economic actors should be targeted. The concept ‘Private 
Sector Development’ means something different in different regions. Traders on 
the local market, being the typical example of entrepreneurs, would normally be 
IDEA’s focus. Some IDEA-officers argued, however, that these traders were actually 
the local top-entrepreneurs and were well-to-do and not in need of much help. 
Instead, they argued that IDEA should target the poor farmers. One IDEA-officer 
told that the consequence of this was that they started to perceive farmers as entre-
preneurs that required entrepreneurial advice instead of merely agricultural guid-
ance. This shows that – what seem to be generally applicable concepts like training 
programmes and the establishment of a BDC – should be tailored to the local con-
ditions. This requires much sensitivity to local economic conditions, which is made 
more difficult by the fact that in Uruzgan IDEA-officers were in the mission area for 
just three months. 
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 The second challenge for IDEA was the nature of the safety situation in Uruzgan. 
The quote at the beginning of this chapter explains in just a few words what the 
major problem was. Uruzgan was particularly in the beginning very unsafe, which 
complicated the work of IDEA-officers. In other missions the safety issue was also 
present but much less so. In Bosnia, IDEA-officers could move through the area 
without force protection. Freedom of movement was more restricted in Baghlan. 
However, in Uruzgan, IDEA-officers typically required 5 Bushmasters and 20 sol-
diers force protection in order to move through the area. This made work more diffi-
cult for IDEA-officers. The military organization (Battlegroup) occasionally denied 
them force protection because there were other priorities. Some IDEA-officers were 
bound to Camp Holland during their stay in Uruzgan. It became difficult for them 
to observe local conditions, to visit entrepreneurs, to establish personal relations 
with locals, etc. Even the BDC which they helped to establish was difficult to reach. 
Another consequence of this safety situation is that IDEA-officers needed to be 
able to persuade the Battlegroup of the value of their activities. If the Battlegroup 
failed to see the added value of IDEA, they could deny them force protection. This 
was unnecessary in Bosnia, because the work of IDEA-officers didn’t depend on 
force protection. A consequence of this is that it was important for IDEA officers 
to establish good relationships with the Battlegroup which was complicated by the 
fact that their mission only lasted for three months.
 The third general challenge for IDEA was the issue of local culture. One example 
that shows the importance of insight in local culture – which is actually an exam-
ple of the Baghlan mission – is the development of cooperatives. Insights in tribal 
structures appeared to be crucial in order to be able to judge the potential success of 
cooperatives. If craftsmen originated from different tribes, developing cooperatives 
proved to be next to impossible. Another cultural issue is the local power relations. 
Generally, development specialists (which were available in Task Force Uruzgan) 
advised IDEA that if they wanted to get anything done, they had to accept local 
culture as a given and therefore they had to deal with local power-brokers. Some 
IDEA-officers regretted they didn’t do more to try to change things, because then 
more profound change would have been possible. Experts on development outside 
the IDEA organization considered that IDEA-officers might be good bankers, entre-
preneurs and consultants in the Netherlands, but lack insights and skills to deal 
with development issues. Opposed to that, different IDEA-officers emphasized that 
the problems of entrepreneurs are universal and as such they have the unique ability 
to understand their everyday problems. 
Reflection on the experiences of IDEA
The relationship between entrepreneurship and inclusive development has been 
the object of rather optimistic theorizing. While this relationship seems valid in 
theory, the IDEA-case shows how complicated the implementation of this philoso-
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phy actually can be. Understanding the complications of this process is essential 
in order to develop the philosophy of stimulating BoP entrepreneurship. Here, we 
want to make a tentative step to model this complicated implementation process. 
In the description of the IDEA-case several variables that impacted development 
and reconstruction are salient. We devised a model that might explain the process 
involved in Promoting Inclusive Development (PID) within the private sector in 
this community (see Figure 15.1). 
Figure 15.1 Promoting Inclusive Development (PID)-Model
 
Fostering Education  
(i.e. Training/ 
advise) 
 
Cooperative social 
structure  
Financial 
mechanisms  
Supportive 
economic 
Infrastructure  
Institutional 
infrastructure 
 
Inclusive development 
Local culture 
Existing economic 
situation 
Safety environment 
Family cohesion and 
emotional stability 
The independent variables in Figure 15.1 are derived from the activities that IDEA per-
formed in Uruzgan. These activities can be interpreted as focusing on an underlying 
more abstract phenomenon that is important for inclusive development. So, providing 
a training-centre shows the importance of education; aiming to develop cooperatives 
shows the importance of cooperative social (family) structures; the establishment of 
a microcredit bank shows the importance of the availability of financial mechanisms; 
the BDC shows the importance of supportive economic infrastructure; and making 
development plans that underlined the importance of – for example – a court system, 
shows the importance of institutional infrastructure. The moderating variables were 
derived from the challenges that IDEA-officers met in Uruzgan, irrespective of a spe-
cific activity (the existing economic situation, the local culture and the safety environ-
ment). We added a further moderating variable Family cohesion and emotional stability, 
which is not directly emphasized in the IDEA-case. However, it is well established that 
many families at the BoP have such problems (e.g., divorces, single mothers, intra 
family violence, /alcohol abuse, gender issues). The stimulation of inclusive develop-
ment would be easier or harder depending on this variable. The dependent variable, 
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inclusive development, is in the end the goal of private sector development activities 
such as the ones performed by IDEA. 
 Although, the PID model is tentative and potentially incomplete and we cannot 
generalize the PID model, it does seem to have the potential to be developed further 
on the basis of existing theory and to use it in comparative research. For example, 
the creation, development and sustainability of family owned micro-enterprises 
(corner stores called ‘changarros’) in Mexico (Trevinyo-Rodríguez, forthcoming), 
most of the variables and activities exposed in our PID-model seem relevant and 
relate in some way to the notion of fostering development in its broader sense. The 
latter provides us with new insights regarding the possibility of replicating devel-
opment solutions in different environments, emerging and post-conflict rebuild-
ing contexts, therefore fostering future comparative research studies between and 
among these economies. 
 A last remark can be made about initiatives such as IDEA. Earlier we called 
IDEA an ‘organizational experiment’ in order to deal with the challenges of post-
conflict rebuilding environments. As such, IDEA could be perceived as representing 
an interesting case in the development of a post-conflict rebuilding policy. Kaldor 
(2007: 12) defines ‘new wars’ as a mix of war, large-scale human rights violations 
and organized crime. New wars ask for a different approach. According to Kaldor 
this implies putting the right of human beings above the rights of states and in 
doing so connecting security with development. In this perspective human rights 
and human development go hand-in-hand. In Kaldor’s view the military entrusted 
with the human security policy is a mix of military personnel, civilians and police 
personnel. As indicated above their primary task is taking care of the safety of 
civilians. Human security forces are neither peacekeepers, nor traditional militaries; 
they combine humanitarian aid and development; they create legal employment 
and institutions focused on rule of law and social and economic development. It 
would be valuable to evaluate to what degree IDEA fits Kaldor’s principles.
References
Calás, M., Smircich, L. and Bourne, K. (2009) Extending the Boundaries: Reframing Entre-
preneurship as Social Change Through Feminist Perspectives. Academy of Management 
Review 34(3), 552-569.
Carmen, R. and Sobrado, M. (eds.) (2000) A Future for the excluded. Job creation and Income 
generation by the Poor. Clodomir Santos de Morais and the Organization Workshop. London: 
Zed Books.
Collier, P. (2008) The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be 
Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Credit Suisse Wealth Report (2011) Global Wealth Report. Credit Suisse Research Institute. 
Ellerman, D. (2006) Helping people help themselves. From the world bank to an alternative phi-
losophy of development assistance. The University of Michigan Press.
KRAMeR, TReVInyo-RoDRÍGUez AnD VeRWeIJ / 220
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 
research. Chicago: Aldine.
Johnson, H.N. and Soeters, J. (2008) Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers, and the chances of 
a “Reversible Destiny”. Political Studies 56, 166-191.
Kaldor, M. (2007) Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press.
Kramer, E.H and Jansen, T. (2011) Het stimuleren van ondernemerschap door reservisten in post-
conflict gebieden De ervaringen en ontwikkelingen van IDEA (Stimulating entrepreneur-
ship by reservists in post-conflict areas. Experiences and developments with regard to IDEA) . 
Breda: NLDA (in press).
London, T. (2007) A Base of the Pyramid Perspective on Poverty Alleviation. University of 
Michigan: The William Davidson Institute. 
Naudé, W. (2010a) Promoting Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries: Policy Challenges. 
Helsinki: UNU-World Institute for Development Economics Research.
Naudé, W. (2010b) Is pro-active government support needed for entrepreneurship in devel-
oping countries? In: Naudé, W. (ed.) Entrepreneurship and economic development. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Paris, R. and Sisk, T, (2009) The dilemmas of statebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of 
postwar peace operations. London: Routledge.
Penrose-Buckley, C. (2007) Producer Organisations. A guide to Developing Collective Rural 
Enterprises. Oxford: Oxfam, GB.
Prahalad, C. and Hammond, A. (2002) Serving the World´s Poor, Profitably. Harvard Busi-
ness Review, 4-11.
Rindova, V. Barry, D. and Ketchen, D. (2009) Introduction to Special Topic Forum: Entre-
preneuring as emancipation. Academy of Management Review 34(3), 477-491. 
Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stern, N. (2002) A strategy for development. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Stiglitz, J. (2002a) Towards a new paradigm for development: Strategies, Policies and Pro-
cesses. In: Ha-Joon Chang (ed.). The Rebel Within: Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank. 
London: Anthem Press.
Trevinyo-Rodríguez, R.N. (forthcoming) Pursuing Financial Inclusion of Family Firms at 
the Base of the Pyramid (BoP): The Case of Convenience Stores and Microenterprises in 
Nuevo León, Mexico. Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship. 
Trevinyo-Rodríguez, R.N. (2010) Empresas Familiares: Visión Latinoamericana. México: 
Pearson-Prentice Hall.
Trevinyo-Rodríguez, R.N. Kramer, E.H. and Verweij, D. (2010). Breaking the poverty trap. 
In: One perspectives. Washington, D.C.: John Hopkins University.
UNDP (2008) Post-Conflict Economic Recovery. Enabling Local Ingenuity. Crisis Prevention and 
recovery report 2008. New York: United Nations Publications.
Voorhoeve, J. (2007) From war to the rule of Law. Peacebuilding after violent conflicts. Amster-
dam: Amsterdam University Press.
World Bank (2005) World Development Report 2005. A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
